Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Theology Faculty Research and Publications

Theology, Department of

11-1-2010

Classical Christology and Social Justice: Why the
Divinity of Christ Matters
Thomas Hughson
Marquette University, thomas.hughson@marquette.edu

Presented at the Marquette Lonergan Project, Second Annual Colloquium: Doing Catholic Systematic
Theology in a Multireligious World, November 4 - 5, 2010.

1

Marquette Lonergan Project, Second Annual Colloquium:
Doing Catholic Systematic Theology in a Multireligious World
NOVEMBER 4-5 2010

Classical Christology and Social Justice: Why the Divinity of Christ
Matters
© Thomas Hughson, S.J., 2010
1. Faith and Social Existence: An Ecumenical Problematic
This inquiry proposes a retrieval of Chalcedon’s (451 CE) classical Christology in
response to a religious problematic of ecumenical breadth in the American context.
Attention to a Christological theme cannot be disengaged from the totality of a doctrine
of the Trinity, and especially of the Holy Spirit. But human discourse proceeds part by
part, and attention to the mission of the Spirit internal to as well as distinct from that of
the Son is not the main preoccupation here. Similarly, a study at greater length would
have to address the problem of the extent to which Chalcedonian Christology has been
and may still be held captive by ideologies operating in the interest of empire, nation,
class, gender, or White supremacy.
In defense of a very broad presupposition that Chalcedon can be extricated from
ideology I would point to, for example, James Cone’s Black liberation theology in its
affirmation of spirituals and gospel music as a legitimate locus theologicus and to the
spirit of veneration for Christ human and divine they breathe, a spirit I would argue is
congruent with Chalcedon.1 Similarly, Virgilio Elizondo’s explanation of mestizo religion
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James H. Cone, Risks of Faith: The Emergence of a Black Theology of Liberation,
1968-1998 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999). See James H. Cone’s “Black Liberation
Theology and Black Catholics: A Critical Conversation,” Theological Studies 61, 4
(December 2000) 731-747 for his reiteration of a long-standing challenge to White
Protestant and Catholic theologians in the United States to tackle White supremacy as a
theological problem. In response see Laurie M. Cassidy and Alex Mikulich, editors,
Interrupting White Privilege: Catholic Theologians Break the Silence (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis Books, 2007). On the difference between well-meant teaching against individual
attitudes and analytic exposure of systemic distortion embedded in social structures and
institutions, see Bryan Massingale, “James Cone and Recent Catholic Episcopal Teaching
on Racism,” in Theological Studies 61, 4 (December 2000) 700-730.
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and theology allows a glimpse into mestizo piety that likewise resonates positively with
Chalcedon.2 It might be worth noting that according to Chalcedon’s teaching the Logos
cannot be defined as possessing in a divine nature qualities such as gender that
belong to a human nature. It goes without saying that the divine nature of the Logos
is not gendered, not male, a point made in studies of Wisdom Christology. Jesus’
human nature is male. In Chalcedon’s meaning of ‘person’, though not in a modern
meaning, it would be accurate to say that Jesus is not a male person because Jesus is
one divine person (not gendered) in two natures, divine and human (male‐
gendered). Jesus is a non‐gendered divine person with a gendered human nature.
Affirmation of Chalcedon does not, that is, necessarily project the interests of a
dominant group, thought this has occurred and still does.
In the United States a larger, typically modern division between faith and
everyday life surfaces in a chronic disjunction between sincere faith in people of good
will on one hand and on the other hand the societal implications of their faith especially
in the dimension of social justice. Preparation and dissemination of official social
teachings by churches from the Catholic, Lutheran (ELCA), Presbyterian Church USA,
Eastern Orthodox, American Baptist, to Evangelicals and some Pentecostals, have not
overcome the disjunction.
What is social justice? “Social justice concerns…the social, political, and
economic aspects and, above all, the structural dimensions of problems and their
respective solutions.”3 It analyzes the “functioning of the major public institutions of the
social, legal, economic, or political orders.” It looks to “the structural requirements for a
just society focused on the human rights and needs of each person.” 4 Social justice
seeks to promote a societal condition in which all people, equal in dignity, enjoy
2

Virgilio Elizondo, Galilean Journey: The Mexican-American Promise (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis Books, 1983-1993) and “Jesus the Galilean Jew in Mestizo Theology,” Theological
Studies (June 2009) 262-281.
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Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, English translation by the Libreria Editrice
Vaticana, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Rome: Libreria Editrice
Vaticana, 2004; Washington, D.C.: USCCB Publishing, 2005) n. 201, pp. 89/90.
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Brian Hehir, “Social Justice,” in Richard McBrien, general editor, HarperCollins
Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York: HarperCollins, 1995) 1203-4.
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proportionally equal access to participation in the social, economic, cultural, civil, and
political life of society. Insofar as changes are needed to bring this access about,
commitment to social justice ordinarily leads to advocacy for specific public policies, an
always controversial matter. In Bernard Lonergan’s analysis of the human good in
Method in Theology social justice would seem equivalent to the good of order at the level
of society, not of culture or of person.5 Robert Doran’s work has developed Lonergan’s
analysis of the human good by elucidating a dialectic in society between practicality and
intersubjective spontaneity.6
The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church summarizes the
importance of social justice for Catholic faith, stating that, “A large part of the Church’s
social teaching is solicited and determined by important social questions, to which social
justice is the proper answer.”7 Racial justice logically falls under social justice but has to
be broken out because otherwise the distinctive menace of White supremacy cannot be
seen in regard not only to Americans of African, Asian, and Latin descent but in regard to
native Americans. Embedded within Catholic social teaching [CST], racial and social
justice have proved difficult to listen to and to accept as belonging to faith. 8
Why is that? A study of parishioners commissioned by the US Bishops in 1998
reported that, “many Catholics do not understand that the social teaching of the Church is
an essential part of Catholic faith.”9 One reason adduced was a perception that social
doctrine was peripheral to the core of faith expressed in Eucharistic liturgy and in the
5

Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Seabury Press, 1972).
Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1990) and What Is Systematic Theology? (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2005).
7
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, English translation by the Libreria Editrice
Vaticana, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church n. 81, p. 36. Surprisingly,
reference to Justice in the World, the 1981 international Synod of Bishops’ statement on
social justice belonging to the preaching of the gospel did not find its way into the
Compendium.
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See Bryan N. Massingale, “James Cone and Recent Catholic Episcopal Teaching on
Racism,” Theological Studies 61 (2000) 700-737. In the Compendium only 4 of 583
paragraphs treat racism.
9
United States Catholic Conference, Sharing Catholic Social Teaching: Challenges and
Directions, Reflections of the U.S. Catholic Bishops (Washington, D.C.: USCC, 1998) 3.
6
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Creed. A starting-point for remedies was, “the need to see more clearly Catholic social
teaching as authentic doctrine and integral to the mission of Catholic education.”10 The
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church addressed that need with a papally
authorized synthesis of CST that integrated social doctrine into the official doctrine of
Catholic faith. That integration is hopeful in principle.
But in practice Jerome Baggett’s 2009 analysis of 300 interviews with members
of 6 Catholic parishes in the San Francisco Bay area opens space for some doubt that a
volume from the Pontifical Council for Peace and Justice will turn the tide in favor of
wider reception of CST. 11 For one thing, in regard to CST Baggett found that “Catholics
gain access to these idioms—concepts such as the ‘priority of labor over capital, human
dignity, subsidiarity, the common good, a ‘preferential option for the poor’, distributive
and social justice, stewardship of the earth’s resources, and ‘just war’ criteria—when they
hear them used repeatedly.” 12 Indeed, he discovered that, “Some use social justice
language to describe how institutions perpetuate racial inequality and therefore envision
institution-level remedies.”13 But this is relatively a small number. More generally,
“public discourse is occurring in parishes. But it is often undermined by a tendency
toward civic silencing, whereby the idioms of the church’s social justice tradition are
expressed less interactively, less incisively, and less regularly.”14 Parishioners, that is,
have not assimilated CST, at least partly because its language, its idiom, is not coin of the
realm. Faith expressed in liturgy, prayer, and profession of the Creed does not seem to
involve a societal dimension and so can be classified sociologically as ‘privatized’.
A condition not totally dissimilar can be found among many Americans in
churches and movements stemming from the Reformation, despite Stanley Hauerwas’s
alarm at social justice saturating Protestant consciences.15 Instead of churches’ social
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United States Catholic Conference, Sharing Catholic Social Teaching, 3.
Jerome Baggett, Sense of the Faithful: How American Catholics Live Their Faith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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Baggett, 186/7.
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Baggett, 189.
14
Baggett, 187.
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For a helpful overview of Stanley Hauerwas’s contribution see R.R. Reno, “Stanley
Hauerwas,” in Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, editors, The Blackwell Companion
to Political Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004) 302-16.
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teaching being a ‘best-kept secret’ as in Catholicism, according to Hauerwas social
teachings have inundated Protestant clergy and laity, all but supplanting gospel and
faith.16 Hauerwas laments that, “If there is anything Christians agree about today it is that
our faith is one that does justice…We are told that justice demands that we must reshape
and restructure society so that the structural injustices are eradicated forever.”17 In
Hauerwas’s perspective Christian commitment to the cause of social justice has induced
rather than overcome Christians’ cultural captivity by the market and the state. So he
urges that churches should return from a social agenda to concentrate on renewing an
ecclesial identity prior to and complete without a social mission. 18 Church witness to
how Christ, gospel and faith transform social existence within the church will contribute
more to the common good than seeking to intervene in or influence public matters.
And yet he need not worry too much about Protestant conformity to an allegedly
misguided message of social justice. The message has not been heard, or having been
heard, has been ignored or resisted. Whichever the case, or a mix of the three, sociologist
Brian Steensland found that from the 1960’s on mainline Protestants in the pews have
distrusted official social teachings from the clerical leadership of churches and from the
National Council of Churches. His explanation for the negative reaction is that Protestant
faithful heard leaders and ecumenists advocating for and teaching racial and social justice
for minorities and the poor in the language of policy analysis rather than invoking explicit

16

See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom: How the Church Is to Behave
If Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1991/1999).
17
Hauerwas, After Christendom, 45.
18
For an objection to interest in social justice by all religions, not only Christianity, see
Shivesh C. Thakur, Religion and Social Justice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
Thakur argues against religious concern for social justice because “religion’s ultimate
goal, namely the transcendental state of spiritual salvation or liberation…must regard
earthly matters as ‘ultimately inconsequential’,” 44. See the Presbyterian Church
USA’s 1954 statement of theological principles for social action: “Religion is about
life in its wholeness,” Presbyterian Church USA, Compilation of Social Policy, Chapter
One, “Theological Basis for Social Action…1954 statement,”
(http://index.pcusa.org/NXT/gateway.dll/socialpolicy/chapter00000.htm?fn=default.htm$
f=templates$3.0).
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theological and moral justifications.19 The result was a back-lash from 1964 to 2000
against an ecumenical social agenda associated with the headquarters and church
memberships in the National Council of Churches USA.20 There is no empirical data on
Eastern and Oriental Orthodox churches in America but it would be surprising if the
situation were not the same there.
A sociological study by James D. Davidson and Ralph E. Pyle confirms the
ecumenical breadth of a disconnect between faith and social justice. They discovered
that in Catholic and Protestant congregations between 1965 and 1995, a period when the
gap between rich and poor had been increasing, congregations allocated funds, staff time,
and selected themes for preaching and hymns more in congruence with a ‘good fortune
theology’ celebrating God’s goodness to the prosperous than a ‘social justice theology’
prophetically addressing the widening gap between rich and poor. 21 That finding
contravenes Hauerwas’s contention that a wave of social justice rolled across Protestant
America. Or if it did, then unbeknownst to him, a simultaneous and ubiquitous movement
rolled it back.
To give their due to Hauerwas and those mainline American Protestants rejecting
a social agenda, perhaps some advocates of Christian commitment to racial and social
justice had conveyed what was received as an implicit secularization of the gospel that
19

Brian Steensland, “The Hydra and the Swords: Social Welfare and Mainline
Advocacy, 1964-2000,” in Robert Wuthnow and John C. Evans, editors, The Quiet Hand
of God: Faith-Based Activism and the Public Role of Mainline Protestantism (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002) 213-236.
20
For an example of pre-1960’s social teaching see the Presbyterian Church USA’s
1954 statement of theological principles for social action: “Religion is about life in its
wholeness,” Presbyterian Church USA, Compilation of Social Policy, Chapter One,
“Theological Basis for Social Action…1954 statement,”
(http://index.pcusa.org/NXT/gateway.dll/socialpolicy/chapter00000.htm?fn=default.htm$
f=templates$3.0).
21
James D. Davidson and Ralph E. Pyle, “Public Religion and Economic Inequality,” in
William H. Swatos, Jr, and James K. Wellman, Jr. editors, The Power of Religious
Publics: Staking Claims in American Society (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1999)
101-14. Their investigation of congregational responses to an increasing gap between rich
and poor in the US 1965-95 used a spectrum between good fortune theology celebrating
God’s material blessings on the righteous and social justice theology calling for more
equitable distribution of resources. Few were at either the extreme but more were toward
the ‘good fortune’ end.

7
portrayed a temporal order of socio-politically institutionalized justice as the central
objective in the mission of Christ. Some interpretations of the Jesus of history as a
prophet of social change have gone in that direction, and been criticized for it by other
exegetes.22 Perhaps Hauerwas has articulated a broad-based recoil in American
Protestantism against a surmised assumption that social justice is the novum of the
mission of Christ, the be-all and end-all of Christianity. No official social teaching from
any church makes a claim that can be understood to state that. But reception cannot be
controlled by the texts alone.
At the same time many but not all Black churches have a tradition of rich social
teaching and preaching that links faith with a deprivatized commitment to practice of
racial and social justice.23 Still, my limited collaboration with gifted Black Protestant
laity and pastors suggests another kind of problem stemming from congregational
independence in the free-church and Pentecostal traditions. Side-by-side practice of
worship and practice of commitment to racial and social justice flourish. But within and
among independent congregations there is not widespread consent to any specific
articulation of a strong theological bond joining the two practices of discipleship so that
for some congregants theological doubt hovers around commitments to practical
activities for racial and social justice. On the other hand, though far less numerous than
their Protestant counter-parts, Black Catholics in principle and practice have sustained a
strong public record in support of the social tradition and documentary heritage of CST
on racial and social justice.24 The deprivatized faith of Black Catholic clergy and laity
22

See Ben Witherington III, The Jesus Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth,
Second Edition (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1997) 64-92 in criticism of John
Dominic Crossan and 137-160 in criticism of Gerd Theissen, Richard Horsley, and R.
David Kaylor. Also see N.T. Wright, The Contemporary Quest for Jesus (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2002; an excerpt from Jesus and the Victory of God, 1996).
23
See Peter Paris, The Social Teaching of the Black Churches (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1985) and Andrew Billingsley, Mighty Like a River: The Black Church and Social
Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For an example of a charismatic leader
see a special issue of the Presbyterian Church USA’s periodical, Hungry Hearts, Vol.
XIII (Fall 2003) devoted to “Howard Thurman: Shaping Spirituality from Love to
Justice,” accessible by way of ‘Hungry Hearts’, and ‘browse back issues’ at
http://gamc.pcusa.org/ministries/spiritualformation/.
24
See the articles in the issue dedicated to “Catholic Reception of Black Theology,”
Theological Studies, 61 (Dec. 2000), and Bryan Massingale, author for Catholic Charities
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exemplifies fidelity to what Andrew Greeley identified as the Catholic imagination
underlying CST.25
The argument to follow will not presuppose that Christ’s humanity is primarily
instrumentum justitiae temporalis rather than instrumentum salutis. It will be that social
justice is inherent in the normative social vision and practice carried in Christianity’s
effective, constitutive, and cognitive meanings. What is at stake is who Christ is as well
as what he taught by word and deed as Scripture and tradition relay the Christ-event to
succeeding generations in the church. Value-judgments about social justice flow from
truths of faith, the theological-anthropological truth that human beings are created in the
image of God, the ecclesiological truth that the church has an orientation beyond herself
to the rest of humanity, and the Christological truth confessed at Chalcedon, that Jesus
the Christ is the eternal Word of God in two distinct natures, human and divine. Explicit
statement that the Word is a distinct, divine person came only with III Constantinople
(680/1 CE).
2. Framing Reception of Chalcedon: Revision or Appropriation?
Presuming that God’s grace is ever-offered and can be affirmed to be independent
of human thought or agency, there is room for theology as the thinking of faith to assist
grace-led reception of social teachings and social justice. Theology’s contribution to
conversion to approval for racial and social justice involves more than invaluable, ongoing New Testament exegeses and indispensable studies in social ethics. Unexpectedly
perhaps, systematic theology in the area of Christology also has something to offer in the
form of recourse to the question posed by Jesus during his public ministry, “who do you
say that I am?” and to the answer as taught by the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) in
conjunction with the Third Council of Constantinople (680/1 CE).
Delving into ideas of Christ at issue in discipleship’s relation to society at large
places the inquiry within public theology, an area that fulfills part of a large theological
USA, Poverty and Racism: Overlapping Threats to the Common Good (Washington
D.C.: 2007).
25
See Andrew Greeley, The Catholic Imagination (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2000). Greeley long has doubted and denied the efficacy of documentary
communication of CST and argues for the primacy of a Catholic imagination transmitted
by example, story, and liturgy that generated CST in the first place.
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task outlined by Bernard Lonergan in chapter 14 of Method in Theology. Called
communications, Lonergan’s method for practical theology fulfills systematics and
completes the mutual mediation between religion and a cultural matrix. Communications
looks to more than how to pass on already attained systematic understandings to
catechists, preachers, clergy, and missionaries. Communications also puts systematic
theology in dialogue with other disciplines, with ecumenism, and with renewal of
common meaning in church and society. Questions about church and society also may
incite a reverse movement of inquiry back to systematics before coming home again to
communications. Such, at least, is the structure of this inquiry: from a question in the life
of the church to systematic Christology, and then back to engaging theology in the life of
the church and through the church in the life of society.
The return to systematics will retrieve and develop, not revise or reformulate,
Chalcedon’s classical affirmation of Christ’s two natures, human and divine, in the Son
of God Whom III Constantinople made explicit was a divine person. Also, ecumenical
consensus on the divinity of Christ grounds the accessibility of this argument to most not
all Protestant traditions and affirmation of Christ’s divinity figures in the criterion for
membership in the World Council of Churches. Baptist rejection of creeds and
confessions nonetheless does not depart from convictions ccongruent with the early
councils including Chalcedon and III Constantinople. Oriental Orthodox non-affirmation
of Chalcedon has to do with historical, linguistic, religious, theological and cultural
contexts but arguably does not oppose the Christological belief confessed at Chalcedon.
However, many theologians think that Christology has been one-sidedly ‘from
above’ ever since Chalcedon, though Eastern theologians have been more likely to notice
that Western faith, piety, and theology have orbited around the humanity of Jesus.26 It
may well be the case that an undercurrent in Western Christianity apart from doctrine and
theology has been an unofficial, imaginative construal of Jesus that begins and ends with
26

See the remark that, “The fact remains that later Christology has often tended to
absolutize Chalcedon, as though it constituted the absolute point of reference, thus
overlooking the relational nature of the conciliar Christology in regard to that of the New
Testament,” in Jacques Dupuis, Who Do You Say That I Am?: Introduction to
Christology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994) 105.
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a doctrinal proposition that “Jesus is God.” Roger Haight thinks that this approach to
Christ is “an imaginative framework that controls the reading of the gospel accounts of
Jesus…a doctrinal imagination.”27 And yet after more than two centuries of historical
searches for the historical Jesus there is something to be said for the Eastern perception of
a one-sided affirmation of the humanity of Jesus, and for Western currents of thought and
spirituality more eager to be clear that “Jesus is a man” than that he is also divine. In fact,
Richard Norris Jr. describes “a new type of Monophysitism—a tendency, in the face of
its own strong sense of the incompatibility of divine and human agencies, to reduce
Christ not to a God fitted out with the vestiges of humanity but to a human being adorned
with the vestiges of divinity.” 28 Belgian theologian Jacques Dupuis (1923-2003) noticed
the same tendency, calling it an “ ‘inverted monophysitism’—that supposes a certain
absorption of the divine nature by the human, by which the divine nature is reduced to the
measure of the human.”29 In Christology if not in piety “ ‘inverted monophysitism’”
seems to have had more influence than Haight’s “doctrinal imagination.”
In that case recovering and developing theological reflection on Christ’s divinity
seeks to regain the mystery of the whole Christ-event in an era more given to
preoccupation with hypotheses from the Third Quest for the Historical Jesus.
Counteracting “inverted monophysitism” does not consist in adopting Cyril of
Alexandria’s pre-Chalcedonian focus on the divinity of Christ as if ignoring explicit
affirmation of two natures. Rather, going beyond a new monophysitism begins with the
principle that all Christology arises and remains within the structure of the whole,
historical Christ-event including the incarnation, resurrection, ascension, and Pentecost,
to which the New Testament bears written witness. In Christology today arguably it is the
divinity of Christ that has fallen out of theological reflection on the whole Christ-event.
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Roger Haight, The Future of Christology (New York: Continuum Books, 2005) 20.
Richard Norris, Jr., “Chalcedon Revisited: Historical and Theological Reflection,” in
Bradley Nassif, editor, New Perspectives on Historical Theology: Essays in Memory of
John Meyendorff (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1996) 140-159 at 155.
29
Jacques Dupuis, “Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ,” in Daniel
Kendall, S.J. and Stephen Davis, editors, The Convergence of Theology: A Festschrift
Honoring Gerald O’Collins, S.J., (NY, Paulist Press, 2001) 320-342 at 333.
28
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Recovery and development of reflection on Christ’s divinity do not lack footing in
one area of contemporary New Testament research. Larry Hurtado, for example, has
shown in Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity that early, Jewish,
monotheistic, reverence for Jesus as somehow divine was an incipient movement ‘from
below’ to ‘above’ in the Synoptics. And a pre-Johannine Paul already was moving back
‘from above’ to below.30 A presupposition of permanent principle not discussed here is
that in the New Testament, and in Christianity both the church’s and individuals’ faith in
Christ and Christology have the structure of a circle continually revolving ‘from below’
in Christ’s pre-resurrection humanity to ‘above’ in his incarnation and risen humanity
united to his divinity, and back to his pre-resurrection humanity, all the while rolling
forward under the impulse of new questions and insights in successive historical and
cultural contexts.
At the same time Roger Haight’s Jesus the Symbol of God casts doubt on the
validity of any recourse to Chalcedon that retrieves its teaching for appropriation rather
than revises it for reformulation. 31 Haight prescribes the importance, and I agree, of
Christology addressing “the humanly caused and systematically ingrained human
suffering that so characterizes our world situation today.”32 He insists too that the
postmodern situation changes the whole problematic in a theology of Christ by moving it
30

Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003). See important discussions by
Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies of the
New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing, 2008) and James D. G. Dunn, Did the First Christians Worship
Jesus? The New Testament Evidence (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press,
2010).
31
Roger Haight, Jesus: Symbol of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, second edition,
2000). There is some affinity between Haight’s project and that of Friedrich
Schleiermacher in The Christian Faith in that both propose an affirming of the divinity of
Christ without locating that divinity in the subsistent Logos. See, however, Richard
Muller “The Christological Problem as Addressed by Friedrich Schleiermacher: A
Dogmatic Inquiry,” in Marguerite Schuster and Richard Muller, editors, Perspectives in
Chhristology: Essays in Honor of Paul K. Jewett (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan
Publsihing House, 1991) 141-162. In Muller’s view Schleiermacher’s “absolutely
powerful God-consciousness” in Jesus did not intend to deny Chalcedon on Logos in
Jesus, 142. Haight’s revision does deny the subsistent Logos.
32
Haight, Jesus, 25.
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to a new starting-point in the “historical appearance of the historical person, Jesus of
Nazareth within the new horizon of historical consciousness. The supposition and point
of departure are defined by the human being, Jesus, and the question concerns what it can
mean to say that Jesus is divine.”33 Here my agreement is qualified by recognition that
New Testament research has shown that this was already a key question raised and
answered within the New Testament and in the early ecumenical councils and is not a
uniquely postmodern query.
With admirable hermeneutical attention to context Haight acknowledges that
Chalcedon made sense within the classical framework of late antiquity. But he goes on to
argue that, “the shift to a historical imagination and point of departure undercuts the
plausibility of the Johannine framework which in turn dictated the metaphysics of the
divine subject, persona, and hypostasis.”34 With that position I strongly disagree, not
least because he ignores the heuristic not metaphysical quality of Chalcedonian concepts,
and because his reading of the Prologue to John’s Gospel is, I submit, simply mistaken in
denying affirmation of the pre-existent Logos in favor of a metaphoric interpretation of
the Logos as a personified divine attribute. 35 Chalcedon, he holds, simply confuses when
what’s needed first of all is re-instating an original meaning that had nothing to do with a
33

Haight, 291.
Haight, 292.
35
To label Chalcedon’s categories, person and nature, ‘metaphysical’ is to attribute to
them a precision and systematic denotation they did not possess. Metaphysical
elucidation of Chalcedon was the work of Scholasticism not part of the council in 451
CE. See Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns
Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). On the undefined, heuristic quality of
the concepts see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “The Origins of Christian Realism,” the
Seventeenth Annual Robert Cardinal Bellarmine Lecture, St. Louis School of Divinity,
September 27,1972 in Bernard J. Tyrell, S.J. and William F.J. Ryan, S.J., editors, A
Second Collection (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974). Similarly, Sarah Coakley
praises Richard A. Norris, amid several criticisms, for insisting that ‘nature’ and ‘person’
in Chalcedon’s Definition of Faith were relatively undefined so that the document is
somewhat open-ended, “What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does It Not? Some
Reflections on the Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian ‘Definition’,” in Davis,
Kendall, and O’Collins, editors, The Incarnation, 148. Coakley proposes that the
Definition has an apophatic character, or what also might be called a mystogogical
tendency, that in Eastern Orthodoxy led to its incorporation into the divine liturgy. This is
true but does not remove a potential for kataphatic development of the sort that transpired
until III Constantinople, and beyond.
34
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divine person in order to reformulate Chalcedon’s teaching away from the pre-existent
Logos as a distinct divine person. In Haight’s view Christology oriented toward social
justice and minimizing avoidable human suffering simply has no path forward except to
revise and reformulate Chalcedon.
Without denying the validity of taking up reformulation of Chalcedon’s meaning,
and without now discussing the merits or not of Haight’s reconstruction of Chalcedon’s
original meaning and reformulation of it, an alternative priority accepted here flows in
another current of Christology. That current includes, for example, Gerald O’ Collins’s
Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus, the Christological
principle in Jacques Dupuis’s theology of religious pluralism, Mark Noll’s Turning
Points: Decisive Moments in Christian History, contributors to The Incarnation: An
Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God edited by Stephen
Davis, Gerald O’Collins, and Daniel Kendall, Kathryn Tanner’s Jesus, Humanity And
Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology, Veli-Matt Karkäinen’s Christology: A Global
Introduction, commentary and notes in Richard Price and Michael Gaddis’s new edition
and translation of the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Thomas Torrance’s Incarnation:
The Person and Life of Christ, and Oliver Crisp’s Divinity and Humanity: The
Incarnation Reconsidered, and God Incarnate: Explorations in Christology .36 These
authors recognize the contextual, linguistic, conceptual differences between Chalcedon

36

Gerald O’Collins S.J. Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of
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and ourselves as grounds for keeping Chalcedon open to reformulation yet they accord
precedence to expounding its teaching. Why would they do that? O’Collins says carefully
and I concur, “I have clearly credited the teaching of Chalcedon with at least a certain
intelligibility and ongoing validity.”37 Declares Noll, and I agree, Chalcedon’s Definition
of Faith “retains its momentous significance” because “the statement faithfully represents
the reality about which it speaks.” 38
3. Appropriating Chalcedon
Now back to Chalcedon. A visit to contemporary Istanbul, tourists are advised, is
best in September or October in order to avoid the broiling summer sun of July and
August. Things were not so different on Thursday October 25, 451 CE when 370 bishops
assembled at Chalcedon a bit north of present-day Istanbul on the eastern sea-coast of the
Bosphorus to sign and acclaim a Definition of the Faith they had produced three days
earlier in session five. 39 The nucleus of that Definition (Latin: definitio; Greek: horos)
confessed that,
one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, acknowledged
in two natures without confusion [asugkutos], change [atreptos],
division [adiairetos], or separation [achoristos] (the difference of
the natures being in no way destroyed by the union, but rather the
distinctive character of each nature being preserved, and coming
together into one person and one hypostasis [hypostasis]) not
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parted or divided into two persons but one and the same Son,
Only-begotten, God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ…. 40
In Part V of the General Introduction, Richard Price supports a modern interpretation of
this Definition as a teaching shaped by Cyril of Alexandria, with moderating Antiochene
affirmation of two natures after the Incarnation. 41 He rejects the interpretation that
Chalcedon synthesized Antiochene and Alexandrian tendencies, or forged a compromise
between them. I see no reason to disagree with Price. In Jesus the Symbol of God
nonetheless, Haight at one point speaks of Chalcedon as a compromise and a synthesis of
the two schools of thought. Yet eventually he concludes that, “the Alexandrian
framework controls the whole vision.”42 He sees the Alexandrian framework as
problematic, however. It conceived the Logos as a subsistent person rather than as an
attribute of Christ.
For Haight the Cyrillian problem stemmed from a patristic tradition of mistaken
interpretations of the Prologue to John’s Gospel that misread poetic, metaphoric language
about divine attributes as propositions about a distinct entity, the Logos. To counteract
Chalcedon’s Cyrillian concept of the Logos as a divine person Haight undertakes
retrieval of Antiochene affirmation of Christ’s two natures. Dupuis and this inquiry
emphasize the two natures but in support of not in opposition to Cyrillian and
Chalcedonian affirmation of the person of the Logos. True enough, attention to the two
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natures of Christ usually serves to keep the historical humanity of Jesus to the fore lest it
be thought of as dissolved into, overwhelmed, or rendered negligible by his divinity.
However, Chalcedon’s distinction of natures equally well directs attention to the divine
nature of Christ. That is the path taken by Jacques Dupuis and I will follow in his
footsteps then strike out in another direction.43
Dupuis highlights Christ’s divine nature in a marvelous theology of religious
pluralism. 44 In a series of writings from 1991 to 2001, Dupuis distinguished two aspects
of the divine nature of Jesus, the Logos/Son of God incarnate.45 The most familiar aspect
is the Logos ensarkos, Jesus the Logos as enfleshed or incarnate, historically causative of
and immanent in the visible economy of redemption and Christianity as its sacrament.
The less familiar aspect of the divine nature of Jesus is the Logos as asarkos (unfleshed
or non-incarnate). The eternal Logos pre-existent to the Incarnation was asarkos.46 After

43

See “A Bibliography of the Writings of Jacques Dupuis, S.J.,” and Gerald O’Collins,
S.J., “Jacques Dupuis: His Person and Work,” in Daniel Kendall and Gerald O’ Collins,
editors, In Many and Diverse Ways: In Honor of Jacques Dupuis (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 2003) 231-269 and 18-29 respectively.
44
Among others, Jacques Dupuis, S.J., Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions,
translated by R. R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991; originally Jésus Christ à la
rencontre des religions, Paris: Desclée, 1989); Who Do You Say That I Am?: Introduction
to Christology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Book, 1994-2001; translated by Orbis Books,
Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 2002; originally Il cristianesimo e le religioni: Dallo scontro all’ incontro
[Brescia: Edizioni Queriniania, 2001]); Toward a Christian Theology of Religious
Pluralism, (Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Press, 1997-2002); “Trinitarian Christology as a
Model for a Theology of Religious Pluralism,” in T. Merrigan and J. Haers, editors, The
Myriad Christ: Pluralism and the Quest for Unity in Contemporary Christology (Leuven,
Belgium: University Press, 2000) 83-97; “Le Verbe de Dieu Jesus Christ et les religions
du monde,” in Nouvelle revue théologique, 123/4 (2001) 529-546; “Universality of the
Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ,” in Daniel Kendall, S.J. and Stephen Davis (eds.),
The Convergence of Theology: A Festschrift Honoring Gerald O’Collins, S.J., (NY,
Paulist Press, 2001) 320-342.
45
See especially Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, ch. 1
“The Cosmic Christ in the Early Fathers,” ch.11, “Jesus Christ-One and Universal,” and
“Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ” in Kendall, et al. editors, The
Convergence of Theology.
46
On difficulties in thinking of ‘pre’- existence see Brian Leftow, “A Timeless God
Incarnate,” in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, S.J., and Gerald O’Collins, S.J. editors,
The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 273-299.

17
the Incarnation, asarkos simply refers to the fact that the hypostatically united human
nature of Jesus cannot possibly ‘contain’, participate in, receive, or mediate the totality of
Christ’s divine nature. Dupuis states that, “The divine action of the Word is not
‘circumscribed’ by, ‘exhausted’ by, or ‘reduced’ to its expression through human
nature.”47 This is to say that the divine nature does not turn into a non-divine nature.
He expands on the transcendence of Christ’s divine to his human nature in noting
that, “The action of the Word reaches beyond the limits imposed on the operative
presence of the humanity of Jesus, even in its glorified state, just as the person of the
Word exceeds the human nature of Christ, the hypostatic union notwithstanding.” 48 This
recognition of difference and divine excess is not only allowable but compelled by the
Definition of Chalcedon.49 It has been orthodox theology of the Incarnation since
Athanasius in the fourth century.50
Though Dupuis nowhere discusses the Reformation, it is the case that Luther and
early Lutheran theologians took exception to Jean Calvin’s assertion of the transcendence
of Christ’s divine nature in the Institutes of Christian Religion.51 Lutheran celebration of
and communion in the Eucharist in multiple places and times seemed to require that
Christ’s glorified bodiliness be omnipresent if Christ is really present in the Eucharist.
Lutheran teaching on the communicatio idiomatum accordingly attributed, or in the term
of Oliver Crisp, ‘transferred’ divine omnipresence to Christ’s risen and glorified human
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nature.52 Lutheran theologians objected to Calvin’s affirmation of a surplus or excess in
Christ’s divine nature over his human nature in the famous vocabulary of the ‘extra
Calvinisticum’, the ‘Calvinist extra’.53
In surveying the world’s religions from a Christian viewpoint Dupuis merely
points out that the divine nature of Jesus exceeds the powers and capacities of Jesus’
human nature as greatly as the divine exceeds the human. After 1994 instead of an
ensarkos/asarkos distinction in regard to Christ’s divine nature Dupuis spoke about the
universality of the Logos and the particularity of Jesus. His focus was on the universal
enlightening influence of the Logos described in John 1: 9: “The true Light, which
enlightens everyone, was coming into the world.” The pre-existent divine Logos
enlightened all people prior to the Incarnation.54 Dupuis then adds that this universal
enlightening which is a saving influence did not cease because of the Incarnation and
continues after the Incarnation but not through, not only through, the mediation of the
human nature and activities of Jesus.
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Dupuis did not edge away from the particularity and centrality of the fullness of
light from the Logos in and through the whole Christ-event. Still, Chalcedon’s
affirmation of two distinct natures unchanged by their union means that the operations
proper to each nature, more clearly taught by III Constantinople (680/1) against
monothelitism, do not disappear because of the hypostatic union. But one of the powers
proper to the Logos is enlightening all people. Therefore after the Incarnation too the
eternal Logos continues to be universally influential and enlightening directly by his
divine nature and not only through the human nature of Jesus active in his ministry,
mission, teaching, death and resurrection and in the redemption visible and
communicable in the churches and historical Christianity.
Dupuis concluded that the universally operative Logos enlightens and inspires
founders and adherents of non-Christian religions at the same time as the same Logos as
incarnate fulfills that enlightening and in divine love becomes present as redeemer within
a humanity that was created through ‘him’ in the first place. As divine Word incarnate
Jesus the Christ is at once the particular, historical man who taught, suffered, died and
rose from the dead and the universal Logos immanent in and active upon the cosmos,
within human history, and in the lives of non-Christians.
In defending Dupuis against some theologians’ misreadings, Gerald O’Collins
pointed out that Dupuis’s texts did not separate the universal Logos from the incarnate
Logos. Instead, maintained O’Collins, “What Dupuis has consistently argued is that
within the one person of Jesus Christ we must distinguish the operations of his
(uncreated) divine nature and his (created) human nature. Here he lines up,” O’ Collins
continued, “with St. Thomas Aquinas who championed the oneness of Christ’s person but
also had to recognize that Christ’s divine nature infinitely transcends his human nature
(divina natura in infinitum humanam excedit), Summa Contra Gentiles, 4, 35,8.” 55
Dupuis was arguing that Chalcedonian affirmation of Jesus’ divine nature means,
O’Collins said, that “the Word’s divine operations are not canceled or restricted by his
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assumption of a human existence that has now been glorified through the resurrection.”56
I will follow Dupuis’s distinction between the original, invisible, constant, and universal
divine operation of the Logos as Creator and the particular though central and
eschatologically universal Jesus of Nazareth.
4. The Logos: Ultimate Source of Social Justice
The distinction and affirmation of Jesus’ divine nature can be turned from the
nature/grace question of God’s saving action in non-Christian religions to the origin of
social justice in the Creator/creature relationship. Dupuis once mentioned “mediation in
creation” by the Logos as an act that transcends the human nature of Jesus. 57 Yet he
never explored the theological consequences of Logos as creating. Six steps into those
consequences are the following. First, seven New Testament passages tell of the Logos’s
(John 1: 1-4) and Christ’s divine agency in creating (1 Cor. 8:6, 2 Cor. 5:17, Eph. 2:15,
Col. 1:15-20, Heb. 1: 1-4, and Rev. 3:14). This became a standard, formal part of church
tradition enshrined in creedal profession that, “Through him all things have come to be.”
The second step is realization that the creating agency of the Logos did not, could
not, cease and desist at the Incarnation. Indeed and to the contrary, Paul proclaimed that,
“There is one Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things come and through whom we
exist,” (1 Corinthians 8:6) and Hebrews 1: 3 exclaimed about Jesus “sustaining the
universe by his powerful command.” 58 These statements attribute creating to Jesus, it is
true. How could that be, since Jesus is a visible human being? John’s Gospel provided the
answer, the self-evidently human Jesus not only acted with divine authority and rose in
divine power but is the divine Logos who became flesh.
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That the Incarnation did not interrupt or halt the creating agency of the Logos is
the gist of a brief reflection by Athanasius in On the Incarnation. Speaking of Jesus as
the Logos incarnate Athanasius declared,
For He was not, as might be imagined, circumscribed in the body, nor,
while present in the body, was He absent elsewhere; nor, while He moved
the body, was the universe left void of His working and Providence…, He
was, without inconsistency, quickening the universe as well, and was in
every process of nature, and was outside the whole, He was none the less
manifest from the working of the universe as well.59
The divine creating agency of the Logos, Athanasius says, did not cease at the
Incarnation.
Third, creating is the divine operation of the Logos least conceivable as an act
and attribute of Jesus’ human nature. The divine Logos’s mediating of the act of creation
from the Father and with the Spirit cannot be transferred to, mediated by, participated in,
or enacted by the human nature of Jesus. Jesus the Logos acted in and through his full,
free humanity when he performed miracles of healing, when he changed water to wine at
Cana, when he walked on the water or calmed the sea, when he forgave and remitted sins
with divine authority, when he initiated the Lord’s Supper with an unheard of change in
the sacred meal of the Pasch, when he breathed the Holy Spirit upon his disciples after
the resurrection (John 20: 22-23). These are referred to as Jesus’ theandric acts.
Theandric acts can be conceived, as Aquinas did, in terms of a divine principal
cause acting with and through a human instrumental cause in a combined causality
producing an effect beyond the capacity of the human instrumental cause by itself. Jesus’
human subjectivity, freedom, imagination, speaking, etc are human realities able to be
drawn into service of the divine operation of the Logos and bring about effects beyond
59
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the capacity of his humanity and due to divine power. However, creating by the Logos
cannot be a theandric activity in which the human nature of Jesus serves as instrumental
cause for his divine nature and person as principal cause. 60 Part of Jesus’ human nature
being human is being ‘created’. Being created means existing in constitutive difference
from the creating source; creatures are not the Creator since they have come to be, and
the Creator has brought them to be. Jesus’ individual humanity shares the limits of all
created reality. The created cannot create itself much less anything else. Jesus’ human
nature was created through and exists in dependence on his creating act as Logos.
Of course, both ‘human nature’ and ‘divine nature’ are heuristic concepts rather
than comprehensive, closed definitions in Chalcedon. This means that whatever belongs
to human nature, and we may not have understood what that is in completeness, is
inherent in Christ’s human nature. Likewise, whatever pertains to God, divinity, and the
Logos, and we have not come to the end of grasping what that is, belongs to the divine
nature of Christ. The divine nature of the Logos is the Logos acting. We do receive as
true, nonetheless, that according to the Prologue to the Gospel of John the Logos brings
that which has come to be into being. Therefore, creating cannot be separated from
Christ’s divine nature.
When Chalcedon affirmed the “distinctive character of each nature being
preserved,” it professed that the Logos did not lose anything proper to divinity by
assuming a human nature. The divine kenosis described in Philippians 2: 6-11 refers to
withholding manifestation of divinity, sovereignty, and power. Kenosis withheld a
manifestation of divine effects, in the humanity of Jesus first of all, but was not loss of
divinity. If creating had been ‘left behind’, then the divine nature of the Logos would
have changed because of the hypostatic union, just what Chalcedon rejected in affirming
that each of the two natures remains unchanged, atreptos.
60

Aquinas denies that any creature can act principally or instrumentally in creating. See
Thomas Aquinas, Latin text, English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices &
Glossary by Thomas Gilby, O.P. Summa Theologiae, Volume 8, Creation, Variety and
Evil (Ia.44-49) (Great Britian: Eyres & Spottiswoode Limited, 1967) Q. 45, a. 5: “…since
creation is not from any pre-existing material to be rendered or prepared by an
instrumental cause’s action…for creative action to be attributed to any creature is
impossible, either by its own proper power or instrumentally as a minister.”

23
Reflection on the act of creating by the Logos leads to recognizing that the
Logos’s agency in creating is the divine act that is the ultimate principle of social justice.
That is, and as the fourth step, Christ as incarnate Logos (ensarkos) acting universally
(asarkos) in the power of his divine nature mediating the act of creation is the ultimate
and universal principle of social justice for Christians and non-Christians alike. All
societies and all religions, not only Christianity, have seeds of social justice sown in their
people by the Logos. As Creator, the Logos always and everywhere is that on Whom all
creation depends, and that from Whom human nature is constituted in self-presence, that
is, in the natural light of human reason receives apart from the mission of Jesus. The
universally and continually active Creator Logos who is Jesus the Christ cannot be other
than, and nothing else can be, the immanent divine source of order in the cosmos and
history. This pertains to human existence in its social dimension as well.
Fifth, why so? Continuance in creating by Christ, the Logos-become-flesh, is an
ordering principle because creation is not chaos, or rather, in contemporary understanding
chaos has the potential for emergent order in accord with what Lonergan designates
‘emergent probability’.61 The omnipresent, immanent activity of the Logos as Creator
revealed in John’s Gospel implies that the Logos is also the source of order in creation, in
whatever way order can be understood. Christ as creating Logos (asarkos) is the ultimate
source of existence and order in all creation in its every dimension, including human
socio-historical existence that also flows so obviously from very concrete, historically
accessible human beings. The Logos creates everything that comes to be, including
human beings who in their self-transcending acts of intentional consciousness directed
toward the good of order are the proximate source of social justice. Creaturely
dependence on the Logos extends to the human capacity to generate meaning, and so
reaches to conscience and concern for the common good, for the well-being of all
members of a society. That is the human inception of social justice. That is, in creating
humanity the Logos is the source also of the proximate ordering principle in a society.
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The concept of order probably has to be reclaimed from guilt by association with
the concept of control and Lonergan does just this in chapter 2 of Method on the human
good. He explains that in groups there is cooperation through institutions (family, mores,
society, education, state, law, economy, technology, church) with defined and assigned
roles and tasks carried out by individuals for the sake of the good of order. Order, by
contrast to an externally imposed unity, direction, and purpose we might say is a
structured, intrinsic unity in multiple operations by an individual or a group. In an
individual physical health and spontaneity is order. In a community, regular and
successful cooperation for common objectives to the benefit of all and each is the good of
order.
The good of order in a society cannot be achieved by anti-institutional anarchy, by
a single institution or person controlling all social authority, or by carefully designed
institutions or policies that nevertheless don’t result in beneficial effects. To the contrary,
achieving the good of order depends on and instantiates, arguably and among other
things, realizing a substantial degree of social justice. Social justice is crucial because the
good of order involves the effective functioning of a society’s major institutions—state,
economy, family, education, religion—for the benefit of the society’s members. Effective
functioning cannot occur except in active contributions from, active participation by, the
members of a society.
Members’ contributions take place in myriad concrete activities such as, for
example, earning a living without working seven days a week, exercising informed
citizenship by discussion, voting, accepting jury duty, etc. living out positive family
interactions as an education for life in the wider society, attaining an acceptable level of
education enabling some participation in music, art, and culture. Today we would add
that members of a society contribute to the common good by learning about and
practicing ecological responsibility. Social justice deals with institutional impediments
blocking access to making those contributions, to participation in those activities.
Otherwise only some members of a society actively participate in the major institutions
which in turn benefit some, excluding others. Exclusion is marginalization. Social justice

25
seeks to identify and overcome marginalization. Marginalization is a malfunction in one
or more major institutions of a society.
Lonergan developed principles for but did not apply his dialectical analysis
directly and in detail to malfunctioning institutions, and in that sense he did not take up
the problem of social justice. Robert Doran, however, has refined and applied Lonergan’s
dialectics in Theology and the Dialectics of History. It may be that Doran’s signal gift to
social justice is his relating of equitable sharing in vital values, a typical objective of
social justice, upwards through community to culture and downwards from divine grace
through culture and community to vital values. And yet, Doran’s analysis can be made
more precise and closer to praxis. Doran’s dialectics become more precise when the
scope of influence from cultural and social values upon distribution of vital values is
more clearly seen to be not simply promoting just distribution of vital goods as
distributive justice but extends to universal access to making active contributions. Social
justice as understood in Catholic Social Teaching is primarily about securing access to
making those contributions, and secondarily about distribution of resources to bring about
conditions making that access possible.
Then too Doran’s analysis would gain practical purchase if picked up by
sociologists and political scientists. I would love to see some sociologists, for example,
take Doran’s dialectics as a basis for framing empirically testable hypotheses for
qualitative and quantitative research on cultural and not only on economic and political
values at issue, whether positively or negatively, in a particular type of marginalization,
that of young Black men from employment for example.
Sixth, when human beings in any culture or religion act toward the common good
in social justice an inconspicuous divine/human cooperation occurs rather than a
Promethean assertion of human intent to remake society. In labors for a socially just
society whose basic institutions serve the common good, the creating Logos and created
human beings work together asymmetrically. The asymmetry comes from the dependent,
participated existence on the human side of the cooperation.
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Still, order in the realm of free individual and socially organized human activity is
a matter of personal and common meaning, truth, and value. When practical attraction to
justice emerges in people of any culture and language and begins to enter into individual
and corporate decisions that originate and sustain mores, laws, institutions, and habits
formed by justice, then justice has gained a foothold in the shaping of social existence.
To that extent justice then becomes an ordering principle in human society in tension
with injustice. As an ordering principle social justice as a public standard, as a societal
objective, and as a personal virtue that apprehends, inquires, deliberates, decides, and acts
toward the common good, has an inner affinity with the creating Logos. Seeking
realization of just order and the common good by overcoming marginalization in any
society aligns people with the creating, ordering Logos. Human agency on behalf of the
common good serves the purpose of the creating Logos even when that human agency
has not been placed under the full effect of saving grace mediated by Jesus, the gospel,
and Christianity and received in faith. Christianity’s distinctive belief in Jesus of
Nazareth as the divine, creating Logos does not lead into a walled enclave opposed to
other religions but becomes an unshakeable Christian principle of support for
interreligious dialogue and cooperation on behalf of racial and social justice.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, faith in Christ, a gift beyond social justice, opens the believer to accepting
all that Christ’s divine nature accomplishes beyond (asarkos) no less than in and through
Jesus (ensarkos). But creating and ordering creation lies beyond the visible borders of
what Christ’s humanity mediates in the economy of redemption. Social justice,
accordingly, is both native to Christianity insofar as Christ’s words and deeds carry its
meaning, and something for Christians to discover, appreciate, encourage, and cooperate
with in plural modalities original to other religions and cultures. Religions other than
Christianity also locate conscience and social justice in the divine/human relationship.62
Christians agree with many Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and other religious people,
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no less than with people at a distance from any religion, that slave labor, racism, heedless
destruction of the environment, absence of universal health care where resources are
available, lack of gender equity, and destitution in the midst of affluence offend human
dignity and are types of social injustice.
The challenge social justice presents to Christian faith is Christological as well as
ethical. The Christological challenge is to let faith in Christ be stirred to expand its scope
from the visible economy of redemption centered in Jesus to affirmative cooperation with
the universal action of the Logos to be sought in dialogue with adherents of other
religions, or none. Christian faith, that is, does not stop at the limits of Christ’s humanity
and of Christianity but casts its obedient gaze to everything coming from his divine
nature too, including creating and ordering within human history under the influence of
self-transcendence in intentional consciousness.
The Christological premise for indifference or resistance to social justice is either
a tacit ‘Nestorian’ separation between the divine and human natures of Jesus, as if not
joined in the person of the Word/Logos, or a view, perhaps an extreme kenoticism, of
Christ’s divine nature as having changed in the Incarnation by losing or alienating the
divine power to create. Contrarily, to accept Chalcedon is to accept the inseparability of
faith in Jesus from discipleship involving commitment to the social justice the Creator
Logos continually labors to bring about. Further, Chalcedonian dogma is the
Christological ground for an impulse and mandate arising within faith for seeking
dialogue and cooperation with any who also promote social justice that institutionalizes
human self-transcendence, a self-transcendence Christians believe is due to the Creator
Logos through Whom all has come to be that has come to be.

Marquette Lonergan Project Second Annual Colloquium,
“Doing Catholic Systematic Theology in a Multireligious World”
CLASSICAL CHRISTOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: WHY THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST
MATTERS
1.

Faith and Social Existence in the US: An Ecumenical Problematic

2.

Framing Reception of Chalcedon: Revision or Appropriation?

3.
Jacques Dupuis's Appropriation of Chalcedon
A. In the Definition (Latin: definitio; Greek: horos) the assembled bishops confessed,
“...one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, acknowledged in two
natures without confusion [asugkutos], change [atreptos], division [adiairetos], or
separation [achoristos] (the difference of the natures being in no way destroyed by
the union, but rather the distinctive character of each nature being preserved, and
coming together into one person and one hypostasis [hypostasis]) not parted or
divided into two persons but one and the same Son, Only-begotten, God, Word,
Lord, Jesus Christ….”
B. Dupuis [1923-2003] appropriates Chalcedon in a theology of religious pluralism:
universality of the Word, particularity of Jesus and Christianity
4. Beyond Dupuis, the Logos Is the Ultimate Source of Social Justice
A. Step #1 New Testament presents the Logos and Christ as creating
B. Step #2 According to Chalcedon creating did not cease at the Incarnation
C. Step #3 Chalcedon implies that creating cannot be attributed to Jesus' humanity
D. Step #4 Christ acting as Logos asarkos in creating is the ultimate and universal
principle of social justice. Why?
a. Step #5 Creating is also order, and creation of humanity introduces an ordering
principle in social existence. (Lonergan's 'good of order' involves realization
of social justice, access to participation in the major institutions of a society)
b. Step #6 Acting toward the common good in any religion or society is practical
(asymmetrical) cooperation with the universal, creating Logos.
5. Conclusion: social justice is ultimately due to the creating Logos,
so Christian faith is inseparable from social justice for Christological not only
ethical reasons and has an intrinsic charter for ecumenical and interreligious
cooperation toward social justice.
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